For more than twenty years I have entertained the design of publishing an English translation of "Der Einzige und Sein Eigentum." When I formed this design, the number of English-speaking persons who had ever heard of the book was very limited. The memory of Max Stirner had been virtually extinct for an entire generation. But in the last two decades there has been a remarkable revival of interest both in the book and in its author. It began in this country with a discussion in the pages of the Anarchist periodical, "Liberty," in which Stirner's thought was clearly expounded and vigorously championed by Dr. James L. Walker, who adopted for this discussion the pseudonym "Tak Kak." At that time Dr. Walker was the chief editorial writer for the Galveston "News." Some years later he became a practicing physician in Mexico, where he died in 1904. A series of essays which he began in an Anarchist periodical, "Egoism," and which he lived to complete, was published after his death in a small volume, "The Philosophy of Egoism." It is a very able and convincing exposition of Stirner's teachings, and almost the only one that exists in the English language. But the chief instrument in the revival of Stirnerism was and is the German poet, John Henry Mackay. Very early in his career he met Stirner's name in Lange's "History of Materialism," and was moved thereby to read his book. The work made such an impression on him that he resolved to devote a portion of his life to the rediscovery and rehabilitation of the lost and forgotten genius. Through years of toil and correspondence and travel, and triumphing over tremendous ob-
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stacles, he carried his task to completion, and his
biography of Stirner appeared in Berlin in 1898. It is a tribute
to the thoroughness of Mackay's work that since its publication
not one important fact about Stirner has been discovered by anybody.
During his years of investigation Mackay's advertising for information
had created a new interest in Stirner, which was enhanced by the
sudden fame of the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche, an author
whose intellectual kinship with Stirner has been a subject of
much controversy. "Der Einzige,"
previously obtainable only in an expensive
form, was included in Philipp Reclam's Universal-Bibliothek, and
this cheap edition has enjoyed a wide and ever-increasing circulation.
During the last dozen years the book has been translated twice
into French, once into Italian, once into Russian, and possibly
into other languages. The Scandinavian critic, Brandes, has written
on Stirner. A large and appreciative volume, entitled "L'Individualisme
Anarchiste: Max Stirner," from the
pen of Prof Victor Basch, of the University of Rennes, has appeared
in Paris. Another large and sympathetic volume, "Max Stirner,"
written by Dr. Anselm Ruest, has been published very recently
in Berlin. Dr. Paul Eltzbacher, in his work, "Der
Anarchismus," gives a chapter to
Stirner, making him one of the seven typical Anarchists, beginning
with William Godwin and ending with Tolstoi, of whom his book
treats. There is hardly a notable magazine or a review on the
Continent that has not given at least one leading article to the
subject of Stirner. Upon the initiative of Mackay and with the
aid of other admirers a suitable stone has been placed above the
philosopher's previously neglected grave, and a memorial tablet
upon the house in Berlin where he died in 1856; and this spring
another is to be placed upon the house in Bayreuth where he was
born in 1806. As a result of these various efforts, and though
but little has been written about Stirner in the English language,
his name is now known at least to thousands in America and England
where formerly it was known only to hundreds.
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xi
Therefore conditions are now more favorable for the reception
of this volume than they were when I formed the design of publishing
it, more than twenty years ago.
The problem of securing a reasonably
good translation (for in the case of a work presenting difficulties
so enormous it was idle to hope for an adequate translation) was
finally solved by entrusting the task to Steven T. Byington, a
scholar of remarkable attainments, whose specialty is philology,
and who is also one of the ablest workers in the propaganda of
Anarchism. But, for further security from error, it was agreed
with Mr. Byington that his translation should have the benefit
of revision by Dr. Walker, the most thorough American student
of Stirner, and by Emma Heller Schumm and George Schumm, who are
not only sympathetic with Stirner, but familiar with the history
of his time, and who enjoy a knowledge of English and German that
makes it difficult to decide which is their native tongue. It
was also agreed that, upon any point of difference between the
translator and his revisers which consultation might fail to solve,
the publisher should decide. This method has been followed, and
in a considerable number of instances it has fallen to me to make
a decision. It is only fair to say, therefore, that the responsibility
for special errors and imperfections properly rests on my shoulders,
whereas, on the other hand, the credit for whatever general excellence
the translation may possess belongs with the same propriety to
Mr. Byington and his coadjutors. One thing is certain: its defects
are due to no lack of loving care and pains. And I think I may
add with confidence, while realizing fully how far short of perfection
it necessarily falls, that it may safely challenge comparison
with the translations that have been made into other languages.
In particular, I am responsible
for the admittedly erroneous rendering of the title. "The
Ego and His Own " is not an exact English equivalent of "Der
Einzige und Sein Eigentum." But then, there is no exact
English equivalent. Perhaps the nearest is "The Unique One
and His Property." But the unique one is
not strictly the Einzige, for uniqueness connotes not
only singleness but an admirable singleness, while Stirner's Einzigkeit
is admirable in his eyes only as such, it being no part of
the purpose of his book to distinguish a particular Einzigkeit
as more excellent than another. Moreover, "The Unique
One and His Property " has no graces to compel our forgiveness
of its slight inaccuracy. It is clumsy and unattractive. And the
same objections may be urged with still greater force against
all the other renderings that have been suggested, -- "The
Single One and His Property," "The Only One and His
Property," "The Lone One and His Property," "The
Unit and His Property," and, last and least and worst, "The
Individual and His Prerogative." " The Ego and His Own,"
on the other hand, if not a precise rendering, is at least an
excellent title in itself; excellent by its euphony, its monosyllabic
incisiveness, and its telling -- Einzigkeit. Another
strong argument in its favor is the emphatic correspondence of
the phrase "his own" with Mr. Byington's renderings
of the kindred words, Eigenheit and Eigner. Moreover,
no reader will be led astray who bears in mind Stirner's distinction:
"I am not an ego along with other egos, but the sole ego;
I am unique." And, to help the reader to bear this in mind,
the various renderings of the word Einzige that occur
through the volume are often accompanied by foot-notes showing
that, in the German, one and the same word does duty for all.
If the reader finds the first quarter
of this book somewhat forbidding and obscure, he is advised nevertheless
not to falter. Close attention will master almost every difficulty,
and, if he will but give it, he will find abundant reward in what
follows. For his guidance I may specify one defect in the author's
style. When controverting a view opposite to his own, he seldom
distinguishes with sufficient clearness his statement of his own
view from his re-statement of the antagonistic view. As a result,
the reader is plunged into deeper and deeper mystification, until
something suddenly reveals the cause of his misunderstanding,
after which he must go back and read again. I
therefore put him on his guard. The other difficulties lie, as
a rule, in the structure of the work. As to these I can hardly
do better than translate the following passage from Prof. Basch's
book, alluded to above: "There is nothing more disconcerting
than the first approach to this strange work. Stirner does not
condescend to inform us as to the architecture of his edifice,
or furnish us the slightest guiding thread. The apparent divisions
of the book are few and misleading. From the first page to the
last a unique thought circulates, but it divides itself among
an infinity of vessels and arteries in each of which runs a blood
so rich in ferments that one is tempted to describe them all.
There is no progress in the development, and the repetitions are
innumerable....The reader who is not deterred by this oddity,
or rather absence, of composition gives proof of genuine intellectual
courage. At first one seems to be confronted with a collection
of essays strung together, with a throng of aphorisms....But,
if you read this book several times; if, after having penetrated
the intimacy of each of its parts, you then traverse it as a whole,
-- gradually the fragments weld themselves together, and Stirner's
thought is revealed in all its unity, in all its force, and in
all its depth."
A word about the dedication. Mackay's
investigations have brought to light that Marie Dähnhardt had
nothing whatever in common with Stirner, and so was unworthy of
the honor conferred upon her. She was no Eigene. I therefore
reproduce the dedication merely in the interest of historical
accuracy.
Happy as I am in the appearance
of this book, my joy is not unmixed with sorrow. The cherished
project was as dear to the heart of Dr. Walker as to mine, and
I deeply grieve that he is no longer with us to share our delight
in the fruition. Nothing, however, can rob us of the masterly
introduction that he wrote for this volume (in 1903, or perhaps
earlier), from which I will not longer keep the reader. This introduction,
no more than the book itself, shall that Einzige, Death,
make his Eigentum.
Fifty years sooner
or later can make little difference in the case of a book so
revolutionary as this. It saw the light when a so-called revolutionary
movement was preparing in men's minds which agitation was, however,
only a disturbance due to desires to participate in government,
and to govern and to be governed, in a manner different to that
which prevails. The "revolutionists" of 1848 were bewitched
with an idea. They were not at all the masters of ideas. Most
of those who since that time have prided themselves upon being
revolutionists have been and are likewise but the bondmen of an
idea, -- that of the different lodgment of authority.
The temptation is, of course, present
to attempt an explanation of the central thought of this work;
but such an effort appears to be unnecessary to one who has the
volume in his hand. The author's care in illustrating his meaning
shows that he realized how prone the possessed man is to misunderstand
whatever is not moulded according to the fashions in thinking.
The author's learning was considerable, his command of words and
ideas may never be excelled by another, and he judged it needful
to develop his argument in manifold ways. So those who enter into
the spirit of it will scarcely hope to impress others with the
same conclusion in a more summary manner. Or, if one might deem
that possible after reading Stirner, still one cannot think that
it could be done so surely. The author has made certain work of
it, even though he has to wait for his public; but still, the
reception of the book by its critics amply proves the truth of
the saying that one can give another arguments, but not under-
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standing. The system-makers and system-believers
thus far cannot get it out of their heads that any discourse about
the nature of an ego must turn upon the common characteristics
of egos, to make a systematic scheme of what they share as a generality.
The critics inquire what kind of man the author is talking about.
They repeat the question: What does he believe in? They fail to
grasp the purport of the recorded answer: "I believe in myself";
which is attributed to a common soldier long before the time of
Stirner. They ask, what is the principle of the self-conscious
egoist, the Einzige? To this perplexity Stirner says: Change the
question; put "who?" instead of "what?" and
an answer can then be given by naming him!
This, of course, is too simple for
persons governed by ideas, and for persons in quest of new governing
ideas. They wish to classify the man. Now, that in me which you
can classify is not my distinguishing self. "Man" is
the horizon or zero of my existence as an individual. Over that
I rise as I can. At least I am something more than "man in
general." Pre-existing worship of ideals and disrespect for
self had made of the ego at the very most a Somebody, oftener
an empty vessel to be filled with the grace or the leavings of
a tyrannous doctrine; thus a Nobody. Stirner dispels the morbid
subjection, and recognizes each one who knows and feels himself
as his own property to be neither humble Nobody nor befogged Somebody,
but henceforth flat-footed and level-headed Mr. Thisbody, who
has a character and good pleasure of his own, just as he has a
name of his own. The critics who attacked this work and were answered
in the author's minor writings, rescued from oblivion by John
Henry Mackay, nearly all display the most astonishing triviality
and impotent malice.
We owe to Dr. Eduard von Hartmann
the unquestionable service which he rendered by directing attention
to this book in his "Philosophie des Unbewußten,"
the first edition of which was published in 1869, and in other
writings. I do not begrudge Dr. von Hartmann the liberty of criticism
which he used; and I
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think the admirers of Stirner's teaching must quite appreciate
one thing which Von Hartmann did at a much later date. In "Der
Eigene" of August 10, 1896, there appeared a letter written
by him and giving, among other things, certain data from which
to judge that, when Friedrich Nietzsche wrote his later essays,
Nietzsche was not ignorant of Stirner's book.
Von Hartmann wishes that Stirner
had gone on and developed his principle. Von Hartmann suggests
that you and I are really the same spirit, looking out through
two pairs of eyes. Then, one may reply, I need not concern myself
about you, for in myself I have -- us; and at that rate Von Hartmann
is merely accusing himself of inconsistency: for, when Stirner
wrote this book, Von Hartmann's spirit was writing it; and it
is just the pity that Von Hartmann in his present form does not
indorse what he said in the form of Stirner, -- that Stirner was
different from any other man; that his ego was not Fichte's transcendental
generality, but "this transitory ego of flesh and blood."
It is not as a generality that you and I differ, but as a couple
of facts which are not to be reasoned into one. "I"
is somewise Hartmann, and thus Hartmann is "I"; but
I am not Hartmann, and Hartmann is not -- I. Neither am I the
"I" of Stirner; only Stirner himself was Stirner's "I."
Note how comparatively indifferent a matter it is with Stirner
that one is an ego, but how all-important it is that one be a
self-conscious ego, -- a self-conscious, self-willed person.
Those not self-conscious and self-willed
are constantly acting from self-interested motives, but clothing
these in various garbs. Watch those people closely in the light
of Stirner's teaching, and they seem to be hypocrites, they have
so many good moral and religious plans of which self-interest
is at the end and bottom; but they, we may believe, do not know
that this is more than a coincidence.
In Stirner we have the philosophical
foundation for political liberty. His interest in the practical
development of egoism to the dissolution of the State and the
union of free men is clear
and pronounced, and harmonizes perfectly with the economic philosophy
of Josiah Warren. Allowing for difference of temperament and language,
there is a substantial agreement between Stirner and Proudhon.
Each would be free, and sees in every increase of the number of
free people and their intelligence an auxiliary force against
the oppressor. But, on the other hand, will any one for a moment
seriously contend that Nietzsche and Proudhon march together in
general aim and tendency, -- that they have anything in common
except the daring to profane the shrine and sepulchre of superstition?
Nietzsche has been much spoken of
as a disciple of Stirner, and, owing to favorable cullings from
Nietzsche's writings, it has occurred that one of his books has
been supposed to contain more sense than it really does -- so
long as one had read only the extracts.
Nietzsche cites scores or hundreds
of authors. Had he read everything, and not read Stirner?
But Nietzsche is as unlike Stirner
as a tight-rope performance is unlike an algebraic equation.
Stirner loved liberty for himself,
and loved to see any and all men and women taking liberty, and
he had no lust of power. Democracy to him was sham liberty, egoism
the genuine liberty.
Nietzsche, on the contrary, pours
out his contempt upon democracy because it is not aristocratic.
He is predatory to the point of demanding that those who must
succumb to feline rapacity shall be taught to submit with resignation.
When he speaks of "Anarchistic dogs" scouring the streets
of great civilized cities; it is true, the context shows that
he means the Communists; but his worship of Napoleon, his bathos
of anxiety for the rise of an aristocracy that shall rule Europe
for thousands of years, his idea of treating women in the oriental
fashion, show that Nietzsche has struck out in a very old path
-- doing the apotheosis of tyranny. We individual egoistic Anarchists,
however, may say to the Nietzsche school, so as not to be misunderstood:
We do not ask of the Napoleons to have pity, nor of the
xvi
predatory barons to do justice. They will find it convenient for
their own welfare to make terms with men who have learned of Stirner
what a man can be who worships nothing, bears allegiance to nothing.
To Nietzsche's rhodomontade of eagles in baronial form, born to
prey on industrial lambs, we rather tauntingly oppose the ironical
question: Where are your claws? What if the "eagles"
are found to be plain barn-yard fowls on which more silly fowls
have fastened steel spurs to hack the victims, who, however, have
the power to disarm the sham "eagles" between two suns?
Stirner shows that men make their tyrants as they make their gods,
and his purpose is to unmake tyrants.
Nietzsche dearly loves a tyrant.
In style Stirner's work offers the
greatest possible contrast to the puerile, padded phraseology
of Nietzsche's "Zarathustra" and its false imagery.
Who ever imagined such an unnatural conjuncture as an eagle "toting"
a serpent in friendship? which performance is told of in bare
words, but nothing comes of it. In Stirner we are treated to an
enlivening and earnest discussion addressed to serious minds,
and every reader feels that the word is to him, for his instruction
and benefit, so far as he has mental independence and courage
to take it and use it. The startling intrepidity of this book
is infused with a whole-hearted love for all mankind, as evidenced
by the fact that the author shows not one iota of prejudice or
any idea of division of men into ranks. He would lay aside government,
but would establish any regulation deemed convenient, and for
this only our convenience in consulted. Thus there will be general
liberty only when the disposition toward tyranny is met by intelligent
opposition that will no longer submit to such a rule. Beyond this
the manly sympathy and philosophical bent of Stirner are such
that rulership appears by contrast a vanity, an infatuation of
perverted pride. We know not whether we more admire our author
or more love him.
Stirner's attitude toward woman
is not special. She is an in-
dividual if she can be, not handicapped by anything he says, feels,
thinks, or plans. This was more fully exemplified in his life
than even in this book; but there is not a line in the book to
put or keep woman in an inferior position to man, neither is there
anything of caste or aristocracy in the book. Likewise there is
nothing of obscurantism or affected mysticism about it. Everything
in it is made as plain as the author could make it. He who does
not so is not Stirner's disciple nor successor nor co-worker.
Some one may ask: How does plumb-line Anarchism train with the
unbridled egoism proclaimed by Stirner? The plumb-line is not
a fetish, but an intellectual conviction, and egoism is a universal
fact of animal life. Nothing could seem clearer to my mind than
that the reality of egoism must first come into the consciousness
of men, before we can have the unbiased Einzige in place of the
prejudiced biped who lends himself to the support of tyrannies
a million times stronger over me than the natural self-interest
of any individual. When plumb-line doctrine is misconceived as
duty between unequal-minded men, -- as a religion of humanity,
-- it is indeed the confusion of trying to read without knowing
the alphabet and of putting philanthropy in place of contract.
But, if the plumb-line be scientific, it is or can be my possession,
my property, and I choose it for its use -- when circumstances
admit of its use. I do not feel bound to use it because it is
scientific, in building my house; but, as my will, to be intelligent,
is not to be merely wilful, the adoption of the plumb-line follows
the discarding of incantations. There is no plumb-line without
the unvarying lead at the end of the line; not a fluttering bird
or a clawing cat.
On the practical side of the question
of egoism versus self-surrender and for a trial of egoism in politics,
this may be said: the belief that men not moved by a sense of
duty will be unkind or unjust to others is but an indirect confession
that those who hold that belief are greatly interested in having
others live for them rather than for themselves. But I do not
ask or expect so much.
I am content if others individually live for themselves, and thus
cease in so many ways to act in opposition to my living for myself,
-- to our living for ourselves.
If Christianity has failed to turn
the world from evil, it is not to be dreamed that rationalism
of a pious moral stamp will succeed in the same task. Christianity,
or all philanthropic love, is tested in non-resistance. It is
a dream that example will change the hearts of rulers, tyrants,
mobs. If the extremest self-surrender fails, how can a mixture
of Christian love and worldly caution succeed? This at least must
be given up. The policy of Christ and Tolstoi can soon be tested,
but Tolstoi's belief is not satisfied with a present test and
failure. He has the infatuation of one who persists because this
ought to be. The egoist who thinks "I should like this to
be" still has the sense to perceive that it is not accomplished
by the fact of some believing and submitting, inasmuch as others
are alert to prey upon the unresisting. The Pharaohs we have ever
with us.
Several passages in this most remarkable
book show the author as a man full of sympathy. When we reflect
upon his deliberately expressed opinions and sentiments, -- his
spurning of the sense of moral obligation as the last form of
superstition, -- may we not be warranted in thinking that the
total disappearance of the sentimental supposition of duty liberates
a quantity of nervous energy for the purest generosity and clarifies
the intellect for the more discriminating choice of objects of
merit?
If the style of this book is found
unattractive, it will show that I have done my work ill and not
represented the author truly; but, if it is found odd, I beg that
I may not bear all the blame. I have simply tried to reproduce
the author's own mixture of colloquialisms and technicalities,
and his preference for the precise expression of his thought rather
than the word conventionally expected.
Steven T. Byington
One especial feature of the style,
however, gives the reason why this preface should exist. It is
characteristic of Stirner's writing that the thread of thought
is carried on largely by the repetition of the same word in a
modified form or sense. That connection of ideas which has guided
popular instinct in the formation of words is made to suggest
the line of thought which the writer wishes to follow. If this
echoing of words is missed, the bearing of the statements on each
other is in a measure lost; and, where the ideas are very new,
one cannot afford to throw away any help in following their connection.
Therefore, where a useful echo (and then are few useless ones
in the book) could not be reproduced in English, I have generally
called attention to it in a note. My notes are distinguished from
the author's by being enclosed in parentheses.
One or two of such coincidences
of language, occurring in words which are prominent throughout
the book, should be borne constantly in mind as a sort of Keri
perpetuum; for instance, the identity in the original of
the words "spirit" and "mind," and of the
phrases "supreme being" and "highest essence."
In such cases I have repeated the note where it
xx
seemed that such repetition might be absolutely necessary, but
have trusted the reader to carry it in his head where a failure
of his memory would not be ruinous or likely.
For the same reason--that is, in
order not to miss any indication of the drift of the thought --
I have followed the original in the very liberal use of italics,
and in the occasional eccentric use of a punctuation mark, as
I might not have done in translating a work of a different nature.
I have set my face as a flint against
the temptation to add notes that were not part of the translation.
There is no telling how much I might have enlarged the book if
I had put a note at every sentence which deserved to have its
truth brought out by fuller elucidation -- or even at every one
which I thought needed correction. It might have been within my
province, if I had been able, to explain all the allusions to
contemporary events, but I doubt whether any one could do that
properly without having access to the files of three or four well-chosen
German newspapers of Stirner's time. The allusions are clear enough,
without names and dates, to give a vivid picture of certain aspects
of German life then. The tone of some of them is explained by
the fact that the book was published under censorship.
I have usually preferred, for the
sake of the connection, to translate Biblical quotations somewhat
as they stand in the German, rather than conform them altogether
to the English Bible. I am sometimes quite as near the original
Greek as if I had followed the current translation.
Where German books are referred
to, the pages cited are those of the German editions even when
(usually because of some allusions in the text) the titles of
the books are translated.